

AD-A274 438



2

**In Pursuit of the Endstate -
What's All the Fuss?**

**A Monograph
by**

**Major George J. Woods, III
Infantry**



**S DTIC
ELECTE
JAN 04 1994
A**

**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

Second Term AY 92-93

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

93-31507



93 12 28061

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED MONOGRAPH	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE <u>IN PURSUIT OF THE ENDSTATE -</u> <u>WHAT'S ALL THE FUSS?</u>				5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) MAJ GEORGE J. WOODS, III, USA					
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES ATTN: ATZL-SWV FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027-6900 COM (913) 684-3437 AUTOVON 552-3437				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.				12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) SEE ATTACHED.					
14. SUBJECT TERMS DOCTRINE ENDSTATE PRINCIPLES OF WAR ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY OPERATION DESERT STORM OPERATION BARBAROSSA FRICTION				15. NUMBER OF PAGES 52	
				16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLASSIFIED		18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED		19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	
20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT " " " " CLASSIFIED					

Abstract

IN PURSUIT OF THE ENDSTATE - WHAT'S ALL THE FUSS?

by MAJ George J. Woods, III, U.S. Army, 52 pages.

The monograph's purpose is to explore the importance of the endstate, its degree of clarity and its effect on protecting national interests. It also investigates the importance the endstate serves in reducing friction within military forces. It primarily focuses on the development of strategic and operational objectives as well as the impact these objectives have on the design of task forces to achieve those objectives.

The paper first defines conflict and its characteristics as they relate to defining the endstate. The differences between conflict resolution and conflict termination are explored. The paper also explores the conditions that affect the degree of intensity and the duration of conflicts based on whether the conflict is more rational or emotional in its character.

The paper then discusses the interrelationship between the principles of war, tenets of operations and other concepts that military leaders have traditionally used to develop campaign plans. The discussion demonstrates the key concept governing the interrelationships is the first principle – objective.

Organizational theory is then introduced to enhance the discussion of the importance the endstate plays in the psychology of organizations. The discussion focuses on the importance of developing operative goals that guide the design of organizational structures and which motivate and sustain group and individual behavior within the organization.

Two campaigns – OPERATION BARBAROSSA and OPERATION DESERT STORM – are analyzed for illustrative purposes to show the effect the endstate played in the planning, organization and conduct of these campaigns. OPERATION BARBAROSSA, the German invasion of the USSR in 1941, serves as an example of a vague endstate; one in which the government and the military fail to achieve consensus. In the dynamics of human interaction, the ultimate purpose of the campaign becomes confused and the German offensive culminates before victory is achieved. OPERATION DESERT STORM, the United States-led coalition in the Persian Gulf in 1991, serves as an example of a clearly stated endstate and its effect on the planning, organization for and the execution of a campaign.

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Title of Monograph: Major George J. Woods, III
In Pursuit of the Endstate -- What's All the
Fuss?

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 5

Approved by:

Randolph B. Wehner Monograph Director
LTC Randolph B. Wehner, MMAS, MA

Accession For	
NTIS	CRA&I <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC	TAB <input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced <input type="checkbox"/>	
Justification	
By	
Distribution /	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	

James R. McDonough Director, School of Advanced
COL James R. McDonough, MS Military Studies

Philip J. Brookes Director, Graduate Degree
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Program

Accepted this 14th day of May 1993

Abstract

IN PURSUIT OF THE ENDSTATE - WHAT'S ALL THE FUSS?

by MAJ George J. Woods, III, U.S. Army, 52 pages.

The monograph's purpose is to explore the importance of the endstate, its degree of clarity and its effect on protecting national interests. It also investigates the importance the endstate serves in reducing friction within military forces. It primarily focuses on the development of strategic and operational objectives as well as the impact these objectives have on the design of task forces to achieve those objectives.

The paper first defines conflict and its characteristics as they relate to defining the endstate. The differences between conflict resolution and conflict termination are explored. The paper also explores the conditions that affect the degree of intensity and the duration of conflicts based on whether the conflict is more rational or emotional in its character.

The paper then discusses the interrelationship between the principles of war, tenets of operations and other concepts that military leaders have traditionally used to develop campaign plans. The discussion demonstrates the key concept governing the interrelationships is the first principle -- objective.

Organizational theory is then introduced to enhance the discussion of the importance the endstate plays in the psychology of organizations. The discussion focuses on the importance of developing operative goals that guide the design of organizational structures and which motivate and sustain group and individual behavior within the organization.

Two campaigns -- OPERATION BARBAROSSA and OPERATION DESERT STORM -- are analyzed for illustrative purposes to show the effect the endstate played in the planning, organization and conduct of these campaigns. OPERATION BARBAROSSA, the German invasion of the USSR in 1941, serves as an example of a vague endstate; one in which the government and the military fail to achieve consensus. In the dynamics of human interaction, the ultimate purpose of the campaign becomes confused and the German offensive culminates before victory is achieved. OPERATION DESERT STORM, the United States-led coalition in the Persian Gulf in 1991, serves as an example of a clearly stated endstate and its effect on the planning, organization for and the execution of a campaign.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	Introduction.....	1
II.	Defining the Endstate.....	5
III.	Principles, Tenets and Concepts	11
IV.	Organizational Theory.....	17
V.	Campaign Analysis.....	29
VI.	Conclusion.....	41
VII.	Endnotes.....	46
VIII.	Bibliography.....	50

Introduction

Generally speaking the United States is a peace-loving nation. It would rather resolve differences between nations through peaceful competition or a combination of political and economic means. Throughout the nation's history United States citizens have been reluctant to use military power to settle international disputes. They believe they have a vested interest in determining whether their sons and daughters deploy to regions around the world to protect or defend US national interests.

"The criteria for deciding to employ military forces exemplify the dynamic link between the people, the government, and the military."¹ The United States does not send its forces to war frivolously. The costs and benefits are weighed throughout the conflict to determine whether military force is still acceptable. Acceptability is determined by the decisiveness of victory, the relative quickness of the conflict, and the minimization of American casualties. If these criteria are not met, then the American people may very well demand that the government remove the military from the conflict.

This American reluctance to use military force is a result of traditional isolationist feelings born in the eighteenth century based on the relative comfort the Americans felt with two vast oceans protecting its shores. Although thrust into the role of world leadership following the Second World War, the United States has not changed its basic view of

using war as the last means to resolve conflict. Deterrence and peace-loving became even more relevant during the Cold War's nuclear parity. The use of military force had to be tempered to ensure the two superpowers did not venture into thermonuclear war. However, with the end of the Cold War the United States' tradition has become harder to uphold. The United Nations and the regional powers friendly to the United States look to the US for guidance and leadership in maintaining regional stability as nations jockey for power in the vacuum created by the Soviet Union's demise.

Not only is the United States under greater pressure to exert its international leadership role, but it experiences internal pressure concerning national strategy development. In the democratic process, civilian leadership and its complementary senior level military leadership change every four to eight years. Consequently, "national policy, military strategy and operational design have a disturbing tendency to accentuate ways and means to the detriment of considering the overriding importance of the ends."² In other words, the military and the country's citizens may admit that there are times military force is necessary to protect national interests, but many of the politicians are reluctant to tell the military, up front, which interests they are willing to risk spilling American blood to protect.

During his tenure as the Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger defined criteria, commonly called the "Weinberger doctrine", to guide American political and military decision-makers when to commit American military power to protect US interests. The intent of the "doctrine" was to avoid wasteful commitment of American lives and resources. His criteria for the proper application of military force were stated in a speech on 28 November 1984:

1) The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest; 2) [the commitment should only be made] with the clear intention of winning; 3) [it should be carried out with] clearly defined political and military objectives; 4) [it] must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary; 5) [it should] have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress; and 6) [it should] be a last resort.³

Several times the Reagan administration's civilian leaders came to the defense department seeking a solution to political problems using military force.⁴ The military was reluctant to commit forces readily. It was also reluctant to commit forces for vague goals. Most recently, the United States military has been criticized by the civilian leadership because of the military's unwillingness to get involved in such operations as Restore Hope in Somalia and intervention in the civil strife in the former Yugoslavia. The military's unwillingness stems from the politicians' reluctance to provide clearly defined goals and/or objectives -- the endstate.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the importance of the endstate, its degree of clarity and its effect on protecting national interests. From a theoretical perspective, its definition is critical to the organization, synchronization, motivation and sustainment of national military power to protect US national interests. It is vital to both the planning and execution of military operations. Its clear definition provides the conditions to reduce the effects of friction that develop when mobilizing a force, especially a very large force, to win war. This paper will answer the following questions: Is the clear definition of the strategic-operational endstate the critical factor in conducting operational art? Is it worth the fuss and frustration to think through clearly defining strategic and operational objectives in very complex and uncertain international conflicts before committing national military power and placing American lives in harm's way? What are the consequences or risks inherent in committing forces before clearly defining the objective(s) to be achieved?

This paper focuses on the impact of the endstate at the strategic-operational level intersection. This an appropriate level of analysis because it is where political goals translate into military goals and it is at this level that military organizations are put together to accomplish specific tasks. They are not organizations dictated by a fixed table of organization and equipment nor are they typically forces that

have a habitual working relationship. Task forces are created for the specific mission and then dissolved.

This paper first defines the concept of the endstate to analyze the impact the endstate's clarity has on the use of military force. Second, the interrelationship of some principles and tenets which guide US military forces in conducting campaigns are examined for their value in demonstrating the critical importance of the well-defined objective. Third, some theoretical constructs of organizational psychology are used to examine the importance the objective plays in structuring and sustaining organizations to accomplish their assigned function. The paper demonstrates endstate's importance in campaign planning and execution from a conceptual point of view. For illustrative purposes, comparison is drawn on the importance the endstate's clarity played in the planning for, the organizational design of and the execution of two campaigns, OPERATION BARBAROSSA and OPERATION DESERT STORM.

Defining the Endstate

What are the endstate and related concepts that help clarify its meaning? At the strategic and operational level it has been helpful to analyze any operation's objective in terms of the ways, means and ends. Ways mean the programs, such as doctrine or tactics, used to achieve the end. The means are the resources available to achieve an end. The end is a termination or conclusion, a natural termination of a process, or

more simply an outcome.⁵ The endstate is more a subset of the end. One can think of it as the "physical condition that represents the end or a part of the end."⁶ The endstate then is a mental image of the conditions that define achievement of the end. It is the leadership's vision of the end. It is communicated by the commander-in-chief in his intent and concept of operation.

For the military the endstate's definition takes on greatest meaning in conflicts where conflict means "the application of conventional or nonconventional force or forces—not necessarily in direct armed conflict—in the conduct of interstate or intrastate disputes...in theory and in reality it is broader in scope than war. War is actually a subset of conflict."⁷ This definition of conflict and war describes the continuum of the use of force to achieve national objectives.

Nations engage in conflict to influence an opponent to behave differently and in a manner that best serves each nation's interests. Conflict occurs because nations cannot agree on a mutually acceptable set of behaviors common to both nations' interests. Commonly, it is a zero sum game. If one nation gets its way, the other automatically does not get its way. One is the victor and one is the loser. Frequently, nations enter conflict with a clear understanding of what they want to gain from the conflict and what they do not want their opponent to gain. Other

times they do not have a clear picture of what they want. Consequently, nations engage in prolonged, wasteful conflicts.

One author explores the concepts of conflict termination and conflict resolution. They are ways of defining the different forms the endstate can take. Conflict termination is the temporary cessation of conflict resulting directly from one nation's decision to stop fighting. One nation uses force until it gets its opponent to do its will. It is a decision to stop rather than the cessation of hostilities because the parties are mutually exhausted. It is temporary because the conflict's core causes are not resolved. The fundamental differences between the nations still exist and fester until the opportunity to resume conflict occurs. On the other hand, conflict resolution permanently ends the conflict between nations. The goal is for one party to cause the other to modify the behavior that antagonizes the conflict. Through reason and less violent exercise of national power both nations come to mutually acceptable terms. In this case, there exists a mutually beneficial solution to the nations' differences although the gains experienced by one nation may not be as great as the opponent nor as great as the nations set out to gain in the conflict. In a cost-benefit analysis the nations agree they have more to gain than lose by resolving their differences.⁶

These terms seem to define a rational process to end conflict. But students of Clausewitz know rational factors are but one-third of

Clausewitz's trinity that affect the conflict's nature. Chance and emotion also play an important role in affecting the duration and intensity of conflicts. A way to categorize the degree of rationality associated with a conflict's causes is to look at whether conflicts are interest-based or value-based. Interest-based conflicts are more transitory in nature. They are more rational in nature. They are game-like. In this view of conflict, nations rationally chose to enter into conflict for an expressed purpose. There is some tangible goal the parties are interested in achieving from the conflict. It has rules. This kind of conflict's endstate is easier to visualize. Alternately, value-based conflicts are more deep-seeded. These conflicts are more fight-like. They are emotional and based on intense hatred. There is an absence of rational rules. As a result, these conflicts are usually more intense, they usually last longer and they are usually void of a rational solution.⁹ The endstate in this situation is less clearly visualized and more difficult to quantify.

The ideal state of entering into conflict with another nation then is to do a thorough rational analysis of the costs and benefits of engaging in the conflict. This cost-benefit analysis is only possible with a clear understanding of the conditions that end the conflict. They may lead to a permanent solution – conflict resolution – or they may lead to a more temporary solution – conflict termination. Ideally, the fundamental

question that should be asked is: how do I want this conflict to look when the fighting has stopped and some semblance of order is restored?¹⁰

The implication is clear. Nations should avoid entering conflicts whose endstate cannot be defined, quantified or easily visualized. If nations go to war without a clear (usually more rational in nature) endstate they may find themselves embroiled in conflicts they are unable to control and thus unable to conclude on favorable terms. Whether the conflict's endstate is designed to be a temporary or permanent solution to nations' differences, the clearer the endstate is the better off the nation is. It eases policy translation into military objectives. In other words, the conditions by which politicians and military leaders can easily envision a beginning and an end to the conflict eases the decision-making process, puts national resources at less risk, and more easily gains national support. Another author expressed it like this:

[It is] imperative that three critical pieces of guidance be developed: a clear statement by the political authorities of the desired situation in the post-hostility phase of the conflict (a vision of what the area should "look like" following hostilities); a clear set of political objectives that will, when achieved allow or cause the above vision to become reality; and a set of military objectives that will, when achieved, allow or cause the above to happen. The resultant guidance will significantly affect how the battle on the ground is to be fought.¹¹

Unfortunately, there are numerous cases of conflicts throughout history when nations did not thoroughly consider the estimated costs and benefits accrued during hostilities. Either one or both of the belligerents

did not consider what they wanted to achieve out of the conflict. Initially, there was no rational choice to enter a conflict. The desire to engage in conflict instead was an emotional choice; one in which a nation-state's core values were challenged. These conflicts are typically fraught with problems. They have no clearly defined endstate. Consequently, opposing nations do not know when their interests are best served. Neither conflict resolution nor conflict termination is reached. Rather, nations fight until they can fight no longer. They exhaust themselves, pause, and resume the fight some time in the future. Resources in money, materiel and, most importantly, precious human lives are wasted in vain attempts to get the other nation to bow to some ill-defined condition or a condition that is totally unacceptable to the other nation. In conflicts where nations' core values are questioned, the entire nation-state fights in "death ground."¹² They fight to the death.

The endstate is critical in defining the political conditions to achieve when applying military, economic and political power against a belligerent nation. What do operational-strategic leaders have to guide them in realizing its importance in an environment of political, social and international pressures to commit forces for political objectives? US forces have used principles of war, tenets and other concepts to guide them in doctrine development and in campaign development to achieve operational objectives. These notions have survived the test of time.

Though professionals understand what the principles, tenets and concepts are, they do not fully understand why they work. First it is necessary to look at these ideas to understand their effect on campaign planning at the operational level. Then it is beneficial to look at organizational theory as a way of explaining why these time-tested concepts have worked.

Principles, Tenets and Concepts

Herman Kahn and Fred Ikle in *On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios*, suggest the critical missing connection between military planning and execution is insufficient thought about how and under what circumstances to terminate conflict.¹³ Ikle further elaborated on this point in his book *Every War Must End* when he said,

Not only military leaders are sometimes guilty of designing wars as if they had to build a bridge that spans only half a river. Civilian leaders, too, may order the initiation of a military campaign without being troubled by the fact that they have no plan for bringing their war to a close.¹⁴

Professionals have done considerable thinking about operational art and campaigns designed to accomplish operational objectives. The doctrine on campaign planning, which is consistent with principles of war and tenets of operational art, illustrates the military's concern with the endstate and the effective use of the United States' national resources. Campaign planning considerations emphasize focusing the plan on a specific objective, organizing the force and sequencing operations to

achieve that objective, and planning for friction (e.g., expecting the unexpected).

Campaign planning, the process of determining the ways an operational force will accomplish operational and strategic objectives, must translate broad strategy into tactical actions. It aligns the operational means and ways to achieve the operational and strategic endstate. JFC Fuller, the noted military writer, spoke of the important link between the campaign plan and the objective. He said, "A plan of a campaign demands a definite object...and this object, in its turn, demands a series of moves each demanding an objective of its own."¹⁵ Fuller implies that series of moves, commonly referred in doctrine as sequencing operations, are planned to create the conditions in which an opponent's options are narrowed until the opponent must give in to the demands placed upon him. These series of objectives may also need to weaken an enemy at the place one chooses to attack him.

Operational pauses, related to sequencing operations, are also important to anticipate in planning. One author concluded that four factors influenced operational pauses. They were weather, shifting the main effort, political constraints, and culminating points.¹⁶ Unfortunately, the commander can only influence shifting the main effort. He might slightly influence the political constraints and culminating points, but certainly cannot influence the weather. Operational pauses are

unavoidable facts of operational art. Therefore, a way to deal with them is to anticipate their effect on operations. One can only do this by thoroughly planning and estimating when pauses are likely to occur, then link them to existing intermediate objectives or link them to intermediate objectives that coincide with the estimated pauses. This creates the conditions where pauses occur at the time and place the force chooses rather than reacting to pauses in situations the force may find disadvantageous.

Military operations are unique in every situation. War is an interactive affair of opponents hiding their intentions from the other side. Therefore, plans are based on estimates of friendly and enemy capabilities. They are usually less than perfect. Consequently, friction—"the accumulation of chance errors, unexpected difficulties, enemy actions, and confusion of battle—will impede both sides."¹⁷ Overcoming friction requires leaders to see the battlefield, to decide quickly, and to act on those decisions without hesitation. They must be prepared to take action with incomplete information, recognizing that waiting for such information will invariably cause them to forfeit the opportunity to act. Similarly, staffs must respond quickly to implement these decisions without creating their own inertia that would increase the friction in the organization.¹⁸

For years the armed forces of many Western nations have conducted wars according to several principles of war. The principles of war have not only guided the conduct of war, but have served as a way of evaluating the conduct of campaigns throughout history. The first listed principle of war is *objective*. To conduct successful military operations, each one should focus on "a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective."¹⁹ Even in operations other than war, where the military may support primarily political operations, the political leadership and the operational commander are not exempt from the requirement of clearly defining the campaign objective. FM 100-5, the United States Army's keystone doctrinal field manual, clearly states this premise: "The ultimate objective of operations other than war might be more difficult to define, nonetheless, it too must be clear from the beginning."²⁰

Harry Summers stressed the importance of the objective in his book *On Strategy*. He noted that it was the first principle of war and deliberately so. He believed all else flowed from it and that it was half the strategic equation.²¹ The objective serves another purpose not mentioned in the Army's new doctrine. It determines war's value. It is this value that the American public uses to assess the costs of war and the level of commitment in supporting a war. The costs are measured in terms of taxes and, more importantly, the risks to American sons' and daughters' lives.²²

Another principle of war critical to the success of any large organization, especially a military operation, is the concept of *unity of command*. This particular principle implies two slightly different concepts that fall under the rubric of unity of command. *Unity of command* itself means that all forces are under one responsible commander. A useful guide to organizing a force for conducting operations is to designate a commander for each objective or intermediate objective of the operation. *Unity of effort*, a related concept, requires coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not necessarily part of the same command structure.²³ Unity of effort may be the principle more operative in combined or interagency operations where unity of command may not be possible but is still desirable.

To accomplish an objective the military organization must create an organizational structure to ensure all the working parts are focused on achieving the overall aim. The military organization at the operational level of war is not a fixed organization. It must be tailored to meet each unique situation. Implicit in making any structural changes in an organization is the fundamental question of what the organization is being structured to achieve. There must be a clear understanding of what the organization as a whole is supposed to achieve and how all its components contribute to that overall objective. Without it, the

fundamental question cannot be answered. Therefore, restructuring the organization's hierarchy without a clear endstate is just guess work.

Besides principles, tenets of operations have served the military well as guides, too. Currently the United States Army has five tenets: agility, initiative, depth, synchronization and versatility. Initiative and agility are most closely associated with the endstate. Combatants and their leaders, in the milieu of combat where chaos reigns, must make decisions on the battlefield with imperfect information. Clearly a force can only achieve and maintain the initiative if the entire force has a clear understanding of its tasks and its purpose. Otherwise, actions are random rather than focused on contributing to an overall objective. A force only maintains the initiative in an interactive free play, such as war, if they have agility—the ability of a force to act and react faster than its enemy.²⁴ Agile forces are intelligent and well-trained forces. However, intelligence and training, without an understanding of the endstate, add nothing to the thorough planning of operations nor to their smooth execution.

Synchronization and versatility also relate to the endstate. Large organizations have many moving parts. With current weapon systems' ranges, forces are considerably dispersed on today's battlefield in space and time. In operations with well-defined objectives, military organizations plan and execute operations to mass the effects of all its

weapons systems -- both lethal and non-lethal. Versatility too is dependent on the endstate. It is the process of transitioning, during the campaign, to a variety of roles and missions in an evolving organization to achieve conditions that define the endstate. The transition causes organizations to shift priorities and emphasis to meet the changing demands of the conflict. A force cannot be versatile without a clear understanding of what the organization is supposed to achieve. Rather it is more dependent on chance than being a planned change.

Much of what the military knows about the importance of the endstate and its effect on organizational structure and on the design and execution of operations is reflected in the scientific study of organizations. Organizational theory is more comprehensive and looks at the holistic set of systems that make up organizations. It looks at the relationships among these systems. Although focused primarily on business organizations there is much it offers the military. Understanding the theory adds depth and new meaning to the time proven principles of war, tenets of Army operations and doctrine on campaign planning.

Organizational Theory

The first theoretical topic discussed in most organizational psychology texts pertains to the critical importance of organizational goals. The concept of goals used in this literature is synonymous with the military's concept of objective. Organizational goals serve several

functions. They focus attention. They provide a source of legitimacy.

They serve as a standard. They affect the structure of the organization.²⁸

The common belief among noted organizational theorists is that:

Those that are able to make their goals sufficiently prominent so that the objectives are, indeed, common knowledge throughout the organization, are presumed to have a competitive advantage in mobilizing collective human effort.²⁸

One way of analyzing organizational goals is to identify goals along a continuum -- from the most general to the most specific.

Organizational theorists agree there are three general categories of goals. First, there are official goals. They are the publicly stated goals of the organization. They are the most general in nature. Operative goals are the next level of specificity. They are the typical day-to-day goals that affect most behavior in organizations. Sometimes these goals are compatible with official goals, sometimes not. An example of official goals and operative goals not coinciding existed in the Vietnam conflict. The United States publicly stated that winning the "hearts and minds" of the Vietnamese people was a key goal in achieving success in Southeast Asia. In reality, units conducted search and destroy missions looking for insurgents. At best these operations only temporarily disrupted village life. In the worst cases whole villages and their livelihood were destroyed. The United States' insensitivities toward the Vietnamese culture often caused the civilian population to become alienated and hostile to the American presence. The inconsistency in matching behavior toward

achieving the official goal occurred largely due to the difficulty of specifying the behavior that leads to winning the "hearts and minds" as well as the difficulty of knowing when that goal was achieved. The third type of goal, and the most specific, is operational goals. Operational goals exist when there is an agreed upon criteria by which goal achievement can be measured and the contribution of that goal to the official or operative goals can also be measured.²⁷ Destroying the enemy's operational reserve, his command and control or his logistics capabilities is an example of this concept.

Linking the goals of the component parts of the organization becomes imperative in focusing the various activities of the organization. A method of linking goals is to conduct some type of means-ends analysis. This kind of thought process involves changing non-operational goals into operational goals. Identifying the operational objectives by phase in a campaign plan is an example of this process. Once this is done, then goals are sub-divided throughout the organization to guide, direct and coordinate subunit and individual behavior.²⁸

Frequently, the larger organizational goal is somewhat intangible in nature (non-operational). It may be vague. In this situation, the process of distilling operational goals from non-operational goals to define tasks required to accomplish the larger objective is better accomplished through a participative process. The participative process aids in more thorough

definition of the objective, it enhances consensus building, and it enhances communication throughout the organization.²⁹ The military decision making process, when practiced regularly and in an environment where open communication is encouraged, is an effective way of building consensus in the organization.

The ability to design organizations is critical to success in military operations, especially at the operational level of war. Van Creveld discusses the necessity to plan for war's uncertainty by better designing organizations. He believes that the quest for certainty will never be fulfilled. War is an interactive affair. Therefore, the secret in maintaining the initiative is to handle information faster than the enemy through the design of organizations or increasing the information-processing capabilities of the organization.³⁰ An organization confronted with a task, and having less information available than is needed to perform that task, may react in one of two ways. One is to increase its information-processing capacity using technological solutions or improved techniques. The other way is to design the organization in such a way as to enable it to operate requiring less information. Failure to do one causes drops in performance. Consequently, friction occurs in the organization.³¹

Operations at this level can rarely be predicted with any degree of certainty. Factors such as the friendly mission, the enemy's likely actions,

the time available to complete the mission, the terrain in the area of operations, and the friendly troops available (commonly referred to as METT-T) affect each operation differently. Consequently, each situation is unique and must be addressed with the proper design of task forces to accomplish each mission. Campaigns at the operational level of war will most likely be joint and often combined as well. Therefore, task forces will have to be designed with appropriate command and control structures to achieve unity of effort. Linking, subdividing and operationalizing goals naturally leads to the next concepts in organizational design: differentiation and integration. The first theoretical concept is differentiation.

Differentiation refers to the division of labor. The most common reasons for dividing the labor in the organization are because of the nature of the tasks being accomplished and because of the people in the organization. Some tasks require specialization and can best occur when groupings occur according to functionality (e.g., what people do). Examples of this concept exist in the staff structure, branches (i.e., infantry, intelligence, etc.) and branches of service. The other concern deals with the span of control. A leader responsible for subordinate organizations can reasonably control 3-7 subordinate elements. To avoid exceeding the span of control other commands (i.e., adding a corps headquarters when there are eight divisions in the theater of operations)

are created at the same level. Therefore, differentiation not only occurs horizontally across functions, but occurs vertically due to the span of control.³²

The other concept of organizational design is integration. It is the means of coordinating tasks across the divisions created in differentiation. It parallels closely the military tenet of synchronization. Porter and associates call it the "concept of rational coordination"³³ – the integration of tasks into a meaningful whole. It is what purposeful organizations intend to do whether it is put into practice or not. Because organizations require specialization to accomplish complex goals, differentiation occurs. The subordinate goals, however, are not independent. Rather, they are interdependent and require coordination with the other parts of the organization to accomplish their required tasks sufficiently. Joint operations, combined arms operations, and the use of liaison parties to coordinate with flank forces are examples of integration.

From a theoretical standpoint, internal friction (in the form of internal conflict) can abound in organizations if: they are not properly designed with a clear operational objective and; they do not link sub-tasks using a reasonable means-ends analysis. The ideal should be clearly stated and communicated objectives – operational goals – to reduce the effects of organizational friction. Operational goals provide a focal point for organizational and individual activities. They shape

decisions about resource allocation, a most important aspect of campaigns where massing effects is vital to defeating an enemy. When improperly planned, the derivation of operational goals that do not specify prioritization, sequencing, or shifting emphasis can be the source of conflict in organizations. They can cause competition for scarce resources in the organization. They cause differences in goal orientation -- a phenomenon in which goals of suborganizations either diverge or conflict. Another phenomenon, goal displacement, can occur. It occurs when the organization does not build goal consensus and misperception or confusion reigns. Normally in the void or confusion a subgroup imposes its own goals.³⁴ The military realizes this dynamic will likely occur more frequently since future operations will likely be combined operations.

Even in the best circumstances, nations will constantly pull and tug as they seek to achieve their own ends. Differing goals, often unstated, cause each nation to measure progress in its own way. This produces differing perceptions of progress. Thus it is imperative that clearly defined and attainable objectives are explicitly stated and shared by participating nations in the coalition.³⁵

Conflict, by this definition, is a form of internal friction that works against the efficiency of the organization.

Internal organizational conflict is "the interaction of interdependent people or groups who perceive incompatible goals and interference from each other in achieving those goals."³⁶ It is a dynamic, interactive process. It is affected by the interdependence of the parties. It involves

the frustrating, blocking or interfering with the other party's achievement of an objective. It occurs in organizations that have clearly delineated operational goals that are tightly linked with the official goals. However, in organizations without these conditions conflict can have paralyzing effects.

Although conflict can be debilitating, it is not all bad. Conversely, total cooperation is not a desirable situation either. There are dangers of too little and too much cooperation associated with organizational structuring. The division of labor and specialization creates feelings of parochialism in the specialized functions. Specialists tend to become more functionally interested to the exclusion of the overall organization. Additionally, favoritism may develop between functions of similar specialties encouraging too much cooperation between the like groups and encouraging conflict with other groups less similar (interservice rivalry is one example). Consequently, errors in the group's direction may not be contested due to the group's smugness. Groups may also not share necessary information due to strained intergroup relations.³⁷

Organizational design is but one aspect of getting large organizations to accomplish complex missions. The other half of the equation is getting individuals at all levels of the organization to exert the effort to make a contribution to achieve the overall mission. Motivating and sustaining behavior throughout the campaign down to the tactical

level is essential to mission accomplishment. The clear definition of the ultimate objective of the campaign, linking the operational goals to achieve this objective and communicating those goals have a significant impact on the effectiveness of the organization. In many ways, the human dimension is more critical than the actual design of organizations. Independent human decisions and actions performed in the context of the overall aim can overcome poor organizational design in many cases.

Effective goal-setting in organizations enhances performance. People accomplish more when they set goals than when they do not. They accomplish more when goals are set for them than when they are not. Those who set goals outperform those who do not. Goal-setting's effectiveness is dependent on certain criteria. It is most effective when the following criteria are followed: goal specificity, goal difficulty, feedback, participation, and expected versus unexpected evaluation.³⁸

Goal specificity positively affects human performance. The more specific the goal, the more likely the goal will be achieved. Specificity is facilitated by setting quantitative rather than qualitative goals. By setting goals, one tends to reduce the range of human performance. It usually leads to more predictable levels of output.³⁹ This point reinforces earlier discussions about distilling clear operational goals from a clearly identified endstate.

The measure of difficulty also enhances human performance.

Generally speaking, the more difficult or challenging the goal the higher the level of performance one can expect.⁴⁰ Goals cannot be impossible to achieve. People can feel helpless when presented with overwhelmingly difficult goals. Additionally, people can refuse to accept the goal. However, the point is to set a challenging objective to achieve and more often than not people will exert the effort to achieve the standard.

Participative decision making generally enhances performance as well. It is not as much a motivational process as it is a cognitive process. Participative decision making aids in greater task clarity. Individuals understand the tasks better, hence they get a better sense of where to direct their efforts.⁴¹ The current command and staff model of decision making at both the tactical and operational levels for single-service, joint and combined operations, when conducted properly with sufficient time, encourages participative decision making. Not only does the command better understand the objective, they are better able to execute military operations without guidance or decisions by the commander.

The importance of participative decision making increases since studies have found that the most important factor in the decision making process is problem identification and recognition. Reliable information is required to identify the problem and its causes accurately. This is easier

said than done. The inaccuracies in problem identification are due to many factors. Among these factors is the effect an individual's experience has on the way they process information. It is affected by the complexity of the organization. The more complex the situation, the more confusion exists as to the accuracy of the data received. Lastly, both of the factors may combine to interfere with reliable information processing.⁴² However, integrating many specialists who are experts in their functions into the decision making process increases the probability of receiving and interpreting the information affecting a problem.

Another aspect of goal-setting that enhances performance is feedback. Feedback coupled with goal specificity and difficulty enhances motivation and performance toward achieving the goal. Obviously the more quantifiable the goal, the more individuals or groups are able to judge how close or how far from achieving the goal they are. Given accurate feedback, they are more capable of judging what corrective behavior they can take to ensure goal achievement.⁴³ Intelligence technology conducting battle damage assessment is invaluable for this purpose. Feedback does not guarantee the person or group *will* work to achieve the goal. The assumption is that they will work to achieve the goal if they know what behaviors it will take to achieve it. Certainly with the quality of achievement oriented soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen in the current force, this aspect of goal-setting can be most beneficial in

enhancing individual and group performance. These assumptions of human behavior may not be cross-cultural, however. Therefore, feedback may not have the same effect on warriors of other nations in combined operations.

The last factor of goal-setting that enhances performance deals with supervisory roles and task difficulty. It has some application to campaign planning or execution. It deals with expected versus unexpected evaluation. Studies have shown that higher job satisfaction occurs under two conditions. When an expected evaluation is coupled with easier goals, performance is higher. For harder goals, performance increases when evaluations are unexpected.⁴⁴ The issue here is one of accountability. If individuals, groups or units are given responsibility for tasks or goals contributing to the overall goal, then various levels of supervision enhance goal achievement considering the tasks' difficulty. One way of making this concept relevant to operational art, however, relates to the commander's presence at the key location and time during an operation. The commander's presence is usually vital to successfully complete a mission. When and where the commander chooses to place himself to influence operations is a judgment each commander makes. It should coincide with what the commander thinks is the critical task to achieve the objective. The clarity of the endstate is one important factor that aids commanders at all levels in making this determination.

To this point the paper has: defined the endstate and its characteristics; looked at concepts, principles of war, and tenets of operations that have traditionally guided the development of campaign plans and; explored organizational theory as a way to understand the psychology of organizations. The final portion of this paper presents a comparative analysis of two campaigns in history to illustrate the importance the endstate played in the success or failure of these campaigns. The campaigns analyzed are OPERATION BARBAROSSA, the German invasion of Russia in 1941, and OPERATION DESERT STORM, the United States-led coalition campaign to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation in 1991.

Campaign Analysis

It is difficult to compare two campaigns because there are so many factors that cause them to be unique. However, the two campaigns studied are similar enough to compare the effects of the endstate's clarity on their success or failure. It is not the author's contention that the endstate's clarity is the only factor determining the campaign success or failure in this analysis. Both campaigns were mechanized and armor battles primarily. Both campaigns were offensive. Both occurred over similar terrain. Both campaigns were primarily conducted by one nation's forces and doctrine (both campaigns had international forces involved). Both offensive forces had air superiority. There were major differences,

too. The forms of government and civilian control of the military, international opinion, weather, operations in other theaters, and locations of sustainment bases are but a few of the major differences. Realizing these similarities and differences the comparison and contrast will look at the following criteria: What was the endstate? And how did it affect the planning, organization, and execution of the campaign?

OPERATION BARBAROSSA

Hitler announced his intent to invade the East on July 21, 1940.⁴⁶

The threat from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics potentially blocked his plan for European continental control. Following the Battle of Britain, the failed attempt to knock the British out of the war, Hitler turned his focus east. His intent in attacking the USSR was to remove them as a threat to German plans before they could become strong enough to attack Germany itself. OPERATION BARBAROSSA began June 22, 1941 after delays of several weeks due to problems erupting in the Balkans, Greece and Crete. Hitler released three Army Groups: Army Group North was directed toward Leningrad; Army Group Center was to seize Moscow and; Army Group South was directed to control the resource-rich Ukraine.

There are some historians who believe the invasion of Russia was doomed to fail from the start. They contend the Germans could never have won a war against the USSR even though their initial victories in the

campaign were stunning. There are at least two authors who believe otherwise. Matthew Cooper believes the Germans could have won the war if they secured Moscow before the winter of 1941. However, they would have had to optimize their forces and focus solely on the capture of that vital city.⁴⁶ Bryan Fugate, on the other hand, believes the Germans could have won if they had concentrated on a winter Ukrainian campaign, cut the supply lines to the North, and then continued to attack north to Moscow when the weather improved.⁴⁷ It is not unreasonable then to assume that OPERATION BARBAROSSA could have been successful.

The campaign ended in December 1941 virtually at the gates of Moscow. From that moment the Germans lost the strategic initiative and unleashed the full wrath of the Soviet army. It led to the ultimate destruction of Germany. Why did the Germans fail? First, one must look at the endstate then determine its effect on planning for the campaign, the resultant organization of forces to achieve success, and the campaign's execution.

What was the endstate? In a conference between high military officials and Hitler on July 21, 1940, Hitler clarified what he wanted Germany to do to the USSR. He wanted to destroy the Soviet army or control enough of its territory to keep Soviet bombers from ranging German territory. There were three political aims: the Ukraine, the Baltic area, and White Russia - Finland. He further clarified the objectives as

Kiev, Moscow, and the Baltic States. The purpose was also to protect the Romanian oilfields. After achieving these objectives, the northern and southern wings were supposed to join to conduct a limited drive on the Baku oilfields in the Caucasus.⁴⁸

There was no additional guidance. The German Army high command (OKH) was free to plan the operation given these objectives. These objectives might possibly have been sufficient to develop an operational campaign if the army and the political head of state trusted one another. The army could have developed its own plan and advised the head of state as to its content. If it met the test the head of state could approve the plan. This did not occur in Germany in 1940. The OKH developed their own plan. Hitler did too. It was not until Hitler's directive 21 reached the OKH on December 18th that the differences in the vision of the endstate became apparent. OKH believed the center of gravity was Moscow. Hitler thought it was Leningrad. Consequently the planning for, the organization for and the execution of OPERATION BARBAROSSA became fraught with internal friction.

Another factor that caused the German defeat was the policy towards the Russian people. Hitler's unstated goal of purifying the countryside of Slavic peoples worked against the military and political objectives. Referring to the earlier discussion about interest-based and value-based conflicts, Hitler turned this war into a value-based war. He

created the conditions where there was no solution to the conflict. The conflict could neither be resolved nor terminated until either all the Slavs were incarcerated or Hitler changed his policy. Neither condition was going to occur. Hitler's policy toward the Russian people gave Stalin all the public support he needed to prosecute the war against the Germans.⁴⁹ This also serves as an example of official goals versus operative goals. Hitler expressed to his army the threat the Red Army posed to Germany. This was plausible. The German Army readily accepted the goal as valid. The German Army would not, however, have accepted Hitler's goal of mass extermination. The difference between these goals would plague the German operations as much as the lack of consensus regarding the center of gravity would cause.

How did the lack of clarity and consensus affect planning? First, Manstein attributes the German's failure on their inability to achieve consensus on the strategy.⁵⁰ This inability to achieve success was evident in the OKH's reactions to the late notice Hitler gave them of his devised plan when OKH received Hitler's directive on December 18, 1940.⁵¹ While the OKH and its subordinate commands developed extensive plans for the operation using Moscow as the center of gravity, Hitler now gave them guidance to develop plans with Leningrad being the center of gravity. OKH believed threatening Moscow would flush the Red Army out where the German Army could destroy them. Hitler believed

that Leningrad was the strategic center of gravity, but this was inconsistent with his endstate of destroying the Red Army and not highly consistent with his goal of seizing enough terrain to protect German soil or the Romanian oilfields.

Hitler and the OKH did not communicate well. They did not achieve consensus on the operational goals. The OKH deliberately wrote a vague campaign plan that appeared to follow the Fuehrer's guidance, but was fought as the OKH had wanted to fight the campaign. The ambiguity in the plan caused difficulty in sequencing the operation. Branches and sequels may have been thought through, but were not well communicated throughout the command.⁵² OKH and Hitler, independent of each other, developed plans based on different assumptions caused by a failure to achieve consensus on the operational-strategic goals. From the start OPERATION BARBAROSSA would probably only achieve limited success at best.

What effect did the clarity of the endstate have on organizing the forces conducting the campaign? The most glaring difficulty it created was the development of a dispersed command and control arrangement. There were three separate army group commands of equal status. No command was identified as the main effort at the start of the campaign. For the most part, each command acted as if it was independent, not interdependent. Consequently, they operated on diverging lines of

operation.⁵³ There was little unity of effort. Equally damaging to the German effort was the dispersal of assets, especially the powerful Panzer Groups⁵⁴, that prevented the Germans from achieving the mass required to achieve success, whether that be Moscow or some other objective.

How did the planning and organization affect the execution of the campaign? The operation was fraught with problems. Commanders operating on diverging lines of operation had difficulty supporting each other. They argued for resources to support their fight seemingly without regard for the overall goal. Throughout the command they lost focus on the strategic objective because there was no consensus on the operational goals they were trying to achieve. Hitler lost focus too. He changed his mind about the main effort during the campaign. The end of July saw Bock driving through the Stalin line to Smolensk and closing his second big trap. Leeb approached Leningrad and Rundstedt was encircling the entire Russian army in the Ukraine. Here the generals disagreed. Bock and Guderian wanted to go to Moscow, part of the original plan. Hitler now wanted to go south. Budenny's entire army group (the Red Army around Kiev) was captured. This became his biggest blunder even though some claim it as Hitler's biggest victory.⁵⁵ He gave up the chance of successfully capturing Moscow before the winter set in.

Some blame the failure of the campaign on the delays caused by the spring of 1941's Balkan campaign. However, the controversy over the strategy to be adopted after the initial successes had been achieved cost the German Army several precious weeks. Additional time and many personnel were wasted by Hitler's insistence on making Leningrad, then the Ukraine and finally Moscow his principal objectives.⁵⁶ Essentially the lack of consensus on the endstate the Germans wished to achieve caused them to disperse their operations rather than focus on some vulnerability that might have caused the Russians to seek conflict termination.

OPERATION DESERT STORM

What was the endstate for operations in Southwest Asia? It evolved in about a week's span. Initially President Bush spoke on August 2, 1990 calling for a national emergency to "address the threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States posed by the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq."⁵⁷ This was too broad. President Bush met with the Secretary of Defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), and the commander-in-chief of Central Command (CINCCENTCOM) and announced on August 5th the goal was no longer to just defend Saudi Arabia against Iraqi aggression.⁵⁸ On August 8th President Bush outlined four definitive objectives that clearly stated the endstate:

First, we seek the immediate, unconditional and complete withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Second, Kuwait's legitimate government must be restored to replace the puppet regime. And third, my administration...is committed to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf. Fourth, I am determined to protect the lives of American citizens abroad.⁹⁹

Some differences experienced in the development of this campaign were the more participative nature of defining the endstate. Bush met with his advisors and set policy based on an assessment of their capabilities and clearly communicated them to the world. This certainly aided in achieving consensus among United States political and military leaders on what they were supposed to accomplish. Second, the statement of the four objectives was more clearly defined than the endstate Hitler described. These objectives provided sufficient limits to guide the development of military operational objectives defined in such a way as to make conflict termination recognizable. There was a recognizable end the military forces could work towards achieving. Additionally, the objectives were couched in such terms that made it possible to gain the support of the American public, the United States Congress and the international community.

How did the endstate aid in developing a coherent campaign plan? First, the planners were able to focus the operation on key vulnerabilities that would cause the Iraqis to withdraw from Kuwait. The planner's first focused on isolating the forces in Kuwait. They focused the air campaign on destroying key strategic and operational facilities controlling or

supporting the forces in Kuwait. Then they focused on the Republican Guards, the elite Iraqi operational force.⁶⁰

The focus on defeating the Republican Guard had many benefits. First, it served to develop a comprehensive campaign plan that coordinated the various activities in theater to defeat the Iraqis. Deception, psychological operations, special operations, air support, naval support and ground combat operations were all focused on achieving one overall goal. Second, the development of subordinate goals and force ratios necessary to achieve victory led to the development of an effective multinational organization.

How was the organizational structure affected by the endstate? The differentiation process logically followed the development of a coherent plan with subtasks leading to an overall objective. Air, sea, and ground forces were organized within their capabilities to achieve specific subtasks. A United States main effort supported by forces from various nations divided the tasks that contributed to the overall success. Rational coordination was handled using innovative means. Special forces teams with translators were made into liaison teams to operate with multinational forces to enhance the exchange of information between forces.⁶¹ Joint command and control arrangements existed to coordinate the multi-service and multinational use of air forces. The Coordination, Communication and Integration Center (CCIC) was created to link

CENTCOM with the Saudi's joint forces headquarters. The intent was to speed coordination between the two commands. It was organized functionally and served to translate plans, intent and information between two forces with extremely different cultures, hence reducing the potential for tremendous friction.⁶²

How did the endstate affect the execution of the campaign? The air campaign began January 16, 1991 following the United Nations' deadline for Iraqi forces to withdraw. The cooperation of United States Air Forces, Naval Air, Army Aviation and special operation forces surprised and overwhelmed Iraqi air and counterair forces. Missiles were fired to attack specific targets not assigned to air forces. The air campaign continued with hundreds of daily sorties flying to attack targets until destroyed. In some cases, targets were attacked repeatedly, depending on the accuracy of damage assessment, to ensure they could not aid the Iraqi forces in Kuwait. February 24, 1991 was the start of ground combat operations that lasted 100 hours. That accomplishment speaks for itself. Besides capturing thousands of prisoners, the Allied forces closed with and defeated the Republican Guard who had little warning. Consequently, friendly casualties during the operation were few. President Bush and General Schwarzkopf agreed that needless slaughter would occur if the war continued and that the preconditions for conflict termination were achieved. A cease-fire was ordered to become effective

at 0800 hours February 28, 1991. Other than a brigade engagement involving the 24th Division and Iraqi forces trying to escape Kuwait on March 2nd, the fighting had terminated.⁶³

The result of the thorough planning built around a clear vision of the desired endstate created the conditions for the Allied forces to achieve a quick and decisive victory. It was a highly successful war won because of the integration and synchronization of multinational and multi-service forces. This was made possible largely because there were clear goals, objectives and missions throughout the force. Each goal was designed to support achieving the desired endstate.

There are those who criticize the United States government, particularly the Bush administration, for not achieving true victory in the desert.⁶⁴ The implicit assumption is that the critics expected conflict resolution to occur. The fundamental differences between the Iraqi government under Saddam Hussein would never be addressed as long as Hussein remained in power. Assassinating enemy politicians is against stated United States policy. Therefore, Saddam's overthrow would have to come from dissension within Iraq itself. Consequently, conflict termination conditions were the only viable solution for the Bush administration. Going into Iraq and taking the conflict to the Iraqi people would have potentially widened the war to one that more fits the value-based category. Bush appropriately identified an endstate that kept

interests in mind and that clearly identified a suitable way of terminating the conflict.

CONCLUSION

This paper set out to answer three questions. The first question is: *Is the clear definition of the strategic-operational endstate the critical factor in conducting operational art?* The answer must be yes. It is at this point that the political objectives translate into military objectives and forces are committed as an instrument of policy. The policy must be framed in such a manner as to organize the myriad of activities necessary to accomplish the policy aims. The aims must be couched in terms that clearly define when the nation's military should stop or when it has reached the point where the gains are no longer worth the cost incurred.

The discussion of the traditional concepts, which include the principles of war and tenets of operations, that have shaped military thinking in planning for and conducting operational campaigns demonstrate the importance the endstate plays in operational art. The first principle of war, objective, is listed first for a reason. It is the central concept around which all others interrelate. Unifying a country's effort, synchronizing large forces, gaining and retaining the initiative, and exhibiting versatility in transitioning military organizations across the spectrum of conflict can only be effectively accomplished when there is a clear vision of what the end should look like.

Organizational theory reinforces these traditional concepts. It adds depth to the understanding of goals and their importance to the organization. Official, operative and operational goals are important in the process of structuring an effective purposeful organization and motivating and sustaining the human dimension of those organizations. Goal definition is critical to the process of defining the tasks to be accomplished and dividing the labor. It is essential for those divisions to have a common understanding of what they are supposed to accomplish so they can rationally coordinate activities that should occur simultaneously or in a proper sequence to accomplish the overall objective. The endstate is that common vision. The more concrete and tangible one can make it the more effective becomes human behavior in organizations. People know what group and individual performance is necessary to accomplish tasks that make the overall organization successful. They know how far they are off the mark. They can make independent decisions on what to do and how much to do to achieve the goals. The analysis of the two campaigns in this paper also demonstrated the importance the endstate plays in the success or failure of operational art. One's failure and the other's success can largely be attributed to the endstate's clarity before the outset of the conflict.

The remaining two questions are: *Is it worth the fuss and frustration to think through clearly defining the strategic and operational*

objectives in very complex and uncertain international conflicts before committing national military power and placing American lives in harm's way, and What are the consequences or risks inherent in committing forces before clearly defining the objective(s) to be achieved? The example given of German forces commitment in OPERATION BARBAROSSA compared to OPERATION DESERT STORM should make the answers abundantly clear. Barbarossa showed how utterly wasteful the conflict became. It became wasteful because the political leadership and military leadership did not agree on an endstate that would achieve the political objectives. The repercussions of attacking the USSR led to the German forces' exhaustion at the gates of Moscow and eventually led to Germany's destruction in 1945. Many lessons were learned and correctly applied in Desert Storm. It seemed apparent to the United States National Command Authority (NCA) the endstate should be described in a way consistent with political aims and within a nation's or coalition's capabilities.

The endstate may have two different intentions. First, it may seek a more permanent solution and attempt to resolve the fundamental difference between warring nations. Second, it may attempt only a temporary solution to end the conflict between the nations. In considering whether to achieve the nation's ends the NCA must assess whether the fundamental differences are on a more rational level instead of an

emotional level. They must also assess whether the benefits gained can be justified by the potential costs the nation will incur in achieving the desired endstate. This must be done before the commitment of national military resources to avoid conflicts that only offer a nation more to lose than gain. Upon committing forces with a clear endstate, the conditions are created to properly plan, organize and execute campaigns without becoming mired in internal friction that can cause an operation to fail.

The United States' senior military leadership is right to avoid wanton use of military force. The civilian leadership that controls and directs the nation's military forces must be aware of the dangers of using military force as a panacea or as a solution to international problems before they have explored all other options. There are conditions when the use of military power is the only solution. There are conditions when the use of military force is also the wisest choice. There are also conditions when the use of military force is the gravest error a nation can make. Deciding which conditions are best for the use of military force starts by defining what the nation wants the military force to accomplish -- the endstate.

If the national leadership has difficulty envisioning what success would look like, then using the military is not a desirable solution to the conflict. If the decision remains to commit military force then the national leadership must be aware of the risks they incur in committing forces.

The political and military leaders' moral, fiscal, and professional obligation in initiating and designing operational campaigns must be to hold each other accountable. Clearly defining the endstate, within the national means available before committing forces to engage in conflict, is the way to hold both parties accountable. To reiterate Ikle's analogy, both parties are responsible to ensure the bridge has a clearly defined purpose, that the materials exist to bridge the gap, and that the bridge actually reaches the other side where it was intended and for the purpose it was originally intended. If used in this manner, military force will continue to be an effective political instrument in protecting national interests.

ENDNOTES

¹ United States Army Field Manual 100-5 (Final Draft), Operations, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, VA, 19 January 1993, p. 1-4.

² Michael R. Rampy, "The Endgame: Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Activities", Military Review, Vol 72, #10, October 1992, p. 43.

³ Bob Woodward, The Commanders, NY, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1991, p. 117.

⁴ Ibid. One example of the Reagan administration's request for military intervention involved an insurgency in the Philippines under Corazon Aquino's rule. The civilian leadership requested the Air Force to shoot down Philippine aircraft to solve the problem. The CJCS recommended patience. The problem was resolved using more peaceful methods.

⁵ Gary P. Petrole, "Understanding the Operational Effect", School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 5 August 1991, p. 12-13.

⁶ Ibid., p. 12-13.

⁷ Rampy, p. 43.

⁸ Ibid., pp. 44-46.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 46-48.

¹⁰ Ibid., p.53.

¹¹ Col. Bruce B. G. Clarke, "Conflict Termination: What Does It Mean to Win?" Military Review, Vol 72, #11, November 1992, p. 85.

¹² Samuel B. Griffith, translator, Sun Tzu The Art of War, London: The Oxford University Press, p. 131. Death ground is "ground in which the army survives only if it fights with the courage of desperation". In this reference it is the whole society that was placed in this psychological position.

¹³ Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios, Croton-on-Hudson, NY: Hudson Institute, 1965, p.201.

¹⁴ Fred Charles Ikle, Every War Must End, NY, NY: Columbia University Press, 1971, p. 6.

¹⁵ Timothy D. Lynch, "Operational Synchronization: A Revised Doctrinal Perspective", School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 May 1990, p. 10.

¹⁶ David M. Cowan, "The Utility of the Operational Pause in Sequencing Battles to Achieve an Operational Advantage", School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1 May 1987, pp. 15-18.

¹⁷ FM 100-5, p. 2-13.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 2-7.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 2-8.

²¹ Colonel Harry G. Summers, On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War, NY, NY: Dell Publishing, 1992, p. 162.

²² Ibid., p. 163.

²³ FM 100-5, p. 2-12.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 2-12.

²⁵ Lyman W. Porter, Edward E. Lawler and J. Richard Hackman, Behavior in Organizations, NY, NY: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1975, p. 78.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 78.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 82.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 83.

²⁹ Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organizations, second edition, NY, NY: John Wiley & Sons, 1978, p. 518-9.

³⁰ Martin Van Creveld, Command in War, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985, p. 266.

³¹ Ibid., p. 269.

³² Porter et al, p. 88.

³³ Ibid., p. 93.

³⁴ Donald D. White and David A. Bednar, Organizational Behavior, second edition, Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 1991, p. 432.

³⁵ FM 100-5, p. 6-2.

³⁶ White and Bednar, p. 359.

³⁷ Morton Deutsch, The Resolution of Conflict, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1973, p. 24.

³⁸ White and Bednar, p. 184.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 185.

⁴² Ibid., p. 204.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 185.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 186.

⁴⁵ Matthew Cooper, The German Army, Chelsea, MI: Scarborough House, 1978, p. 252.

⁴⁶ Robert Epstein, editor, "The Historical Practice of Operational Art", School of Advanced Military Studies Course Four Syllabus, Fort Leavenworth, KS, Academic Year 92-93, p. 4-18-2.

⁴⁷ Bryan Fugate, Operation Barbarossa, Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1984, p.

⁴⁸ Cooper, p. 259.

⁴⁹ JFC Fuller, The Conduct of War 1789-1961, NY, NY: Da Capo Press, 1962, pp. 261-3.

⁵⁰ Erich Von Manstein, Lost Victories, Novato, CA: Presidio, 1958, pp. 175-6.

⁵¹ Cooper, p. 264. "In the theatre of operations... the main weight of the attack will be delivered in the northern area. Two army groups (in the centre of the whole front) will have the task of advancing... from the area about and north of Warsaw, and routing the enemy forces in White Russia. This will make it possible for strong mobile forces to advance northwards and, in conjunction with the northern army group operating out of East Prussia in the general direction of Leningrad, to destroy the enemy forces operating in the Baltic area. Only after the fulfillment of this first essential task, which must include the occupation of Leningrad and Kronstadt, will the attack be continued with the intention of occupying Moscow, an important centre of communications and of the armaments industry. Only a surprisingly rapid collapse of Russian resistance could justify the simultaneous pursuit of both objectives."

⁵² Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader, NY, NY: Ballantine Books, 1957, p. 123. In Guderian's words: "I received at my headquarters only bare indications of the Supreme Command's intentions for the second phase of the operation after the first objectives (in the case of my corps the area Roslavl-Elnya-Smolensk) had been reached. These envisaged first of all the capture of Leningrad and the Baltic coast, so that contact might be established with the Finns and Army Group North safely supplied by sea... This operation would have had one great advantage; it would once and for all have secured the left wing of the German armies fighting in Russia. In my opinion this was the best plan that could have been devised in the circumstances, but unfortunately I never heard anything more about it."

⁵³ Ibid., p. 118.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 121.

⁵⁵ Ropp, Theodore, War in the Modern World, NY, NY: Collier Books, 1962, p. 335.

⁵⁶ Department of the Army Pamphlet 20-260, The German Campaigns in the Balkans (Spring 1941), Washington, D.C., November 1953, p. 152.

⁵⁷ Summers, p. 172.

⁵⁸ Woodward, p. 260. On a live CNN tape on the White House lawn President Bush stated that the goal would be to rid Kuwait of the Iraqis when he said: "our determination to reverse out this aggression... This will not stand. This will not stand, this aggression against Kuwait."

⁵⁹ Summers, p. 173.

⁶⁰ U.S. News and World Report, Triumph Without Victory, NY, NY: Times Books, 1992, p. 409. "The goal... was to confuse and terrorize the Iraqis and to force them to surrender or flee, but to avoid battles where possible. In conception and execution, the Allied war plan did just that. A devastating air campaign took away the enemy's intelligence sources, leaving him bewildered and fearful, and exhausted from relentless

bombing. Feints and deception kept the Iraqis pinned in place, while the ground forces swept around their defense and rolled them up from behind. Only the Republican Guard stood and fought, and they were stunned and ultimately destroyed by the range and accuracy of superior American weaponry, which allowed soldiers to kill their opponents from long distances, before the enemy was even in a position to fix his sights on a target and fire on it."

⁶¹ James Blackwell, Thunder in the Desert, NY, NY: Bantam Books, 1991, p. 173.

⁶² Barry A. Maxwell, "Establishing Theater Command and Control in a Coalition of Nations: Requirements for US Doctrine, School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2 May 1992, p. 20-1.

⁶³ Blackwell, p. 210.

⁶⁴ Roger Cohen and Claudio Gatti, In the Eye of the Storm, NY, NY: Fauer, Straus, and Giroux, 1991, p. 294. The authors stated the Republican Guard was General Schwarzkopf's personal goal in OPERATION DESERT STORM.

and US News and World Report, p. 400. The writers argue it was a "tragic conclusion" that the Republican Guard escaped and was available to put down Shiite rebellion in southern Iraq that might have toppled Saddam's regime, thereby assuring victory. They did caveat this conclusion, however, by saying, "after the war, it was easy to argue that the allies should have further pursued the Republican Guard, destroyed them, and occupied southern Iraq if necessary to prevent Saddam's crushing of the Shiites. But it is difficult to see how such effects would have succeeded militarily."

Bibliography

Books:

Blackwell, James, Thunder in the Desert, NY, NY: Bantam Books, 1991.

Clausewitz, Carl von, On War, translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Cohen, Roger and Gatti, Claudio, In the Eye of the Storm, NY, NY: Fauer, Straus, and Giroux, 1991.

Cooper, Matthew, The German Army, Chelsea, MI: Scarborough House, 1978.

Department of the Army Pamphlet 20-260, The German Campaigns in the Balkans (Spring 1941), Washington, D.C., November 1953.

Deutsch, Morton, The Resolution of Conflict, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1973.

Fugate, Bryan, Operation Barbarossa, Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1984.

Fuller, JFC, The Conduct of War 1789-1961, NY, NY: Da Capo Press, 1962.

Gordon, Judith R., A Diagnostic Approach to Organizational Behavior, third edition, Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 1991.

Griffith, Samuel B., translator, Sun Tzu The Art of War, London: The Oxford University Press, p. 131.

Guderian, Heinz, Panzer Leader, NY, NY: Ballantine Books, 1957.

Hodge, B. J. and Anthony, William P., Organization Theory, fourth edition, Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 1991.

Ikle, Fred Charles, Every War Must End, NY, NY: Columbia University Press, 1971.

Kahn, Herman, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios, NY, NY: Praeger, 1965.

Katz, Daniel and Kahn, Robert L., The Social Psychology of Organizations, second edition, NY, NY: John Wiley & Sons, 1978.

Manstein, Erich Von, Lost Victories, Novato, CA: Presidio, 1958.

Porter, Lyman W., Lawler, Edward E. and Hackman, J. Richard, Behavior in Organizations, NY, NY: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1975.

Ropp, Theodore, War in the Modern World, NY, NY: Collier Books, 1962.

Summers, Colonel Harry G., On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War, NY, NY: Dell Publishing, 1992.

U.S. News and World Report, Triumph Without Victory, NY, NY: Times Books, 1992.

United States Army Field Manual 100-5 (Final Draft), Operations, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, VA, 19 January 1993.

Van Creveld, Martin, Command in War, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985.

White, Donald D. and Bednar, David A., Organizational Behavior, second edition, Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 1991.

Woodward, Bob, The Commanders, NY, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1991.

Wright, Gordon, The Ordeal of Total War, NY, NY: Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 1968.

Young, Peter BG, ed., Atlas of the Second World War, NY, NY: Paragon Books, 1974.

Monographs/Articles:

Baggott, C. L., "Achieving the Operational Endstate: The Linkage of Military Operations with Regional Strategy", School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 23 April 1991.

Clarke, Col. Bruce B. G., "Conflict Termination: What Does It Mean to Win?" Military Review, Vol 72, #11, November 1992, pp. 85-86.

Cowan, David M., "The Utility of the Operational Pause in Sequencing Battles to Achieve an Operational Advantage", School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1 May 1987.

Epstein, Robert, editor, "The Historical Practice of Operational Art", School of Advanced Military Studies Course Four Syllabus, Fort Leavenworth, KS, Academic Year 92-93.

Goehring, Russel J., "Sequencing Operations: The Critical Path of Operational Art", School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1 May 1987.

Kimmitt, Mark T., "Decision Making in Contingency Operations: Different Conflicts, Different Challenges", School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS, May 1989.

Lynch, Timothy D., "Operational Synchronization: A Revised Doctrinal Perspective", School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 May 1990.

Maxwell, Barry A., "Establishing Theater Command and Control in a Coalition of Nations: Requirements for US Doctrine, School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2 May 1992.

Petrole, Gary P., "Understanding the Operational Effect", School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 5 August 1991.

Rampy, Michael R., "The Endgame: Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Activities", Military Review, Vol 72, #10, October 1992, pp. 42-54.

United States Strategic Studies Institute, Campaign Planning (Final Report), Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1988.